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THE PROBLEM
This paper presents some thoughts on the possibleimpact on the legal capacity of children orphanedby the aids pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa.
Throughout history the human spirit has shown resilience
in the face of disheartening and frightening catastrophy in
all its myriad forms, and the human mind can adapt to and
accommodate the daily and personal actuality of a
catastrophy so large that its extent and implications are
beyond imagination.
Statistics show the scale and the trends of the aids
pandemic, but that evidence in itself is not indicative of the
structural changes that society will undergo in
consequence of those trends. Without the immediacy of
personal experience any consideration of such matters
remains theoretical without connection to practical reality.
What is the practical situation (personally experienced by
many thousands of children) that the law has to be capable
of addressing as a result of the aids pandemic?
One reality is that children under the age of legal
majority are having to care for themselves and younger
siblings. The numbers are so large that state resources and
infrastructure cannot begin to provide direct care for those
children, who continue to live in their home environment
without parents, uncles, aunts, cousins, and often without
grandparents. The fact of their survival and ability to adapt
is an instance of the resilience and survival instinct of
humankind.
Society will have to organise itself to provide protection,
food, clothing, shelter, and education to families of
children who do not necessarily have the day to day
support and guidance of reliable and trustworthy adults. In
order to live daily life, the children who have responsibility
for themselves and for younger brothers and sisters will
have to be equipped with the legal capacity to deal with
government, aid agencies, landlords, creditors, suppliers of
essentials, employers and all those people and
organisations that the adult parents of children would
normally have to deal with.
This paper considers the need for children to have the
legal capacity to enforce the right to shelter.
THE STATISTICS
The World Health Organisation (1995) estimates that
HIV had infected 15 million people by 1995, of whom one
million were children. There is an estimate that there are
now 10 million unaccompanied children in sub-Saharan
Africa due to HIV, and it is calculated that by 2010 there
will be 26 million unaccompanied children in Africa and
41 million unaccompanied children globally. A significant
proportion of these children will have dead mothers and
fathers.
The 1996 South African Census registers 168,382
children with both parents dead. There are statistics for the
Free State, which were compiled from a survey undertaken
during 2002 on behalf of the Department of Education.
Included within that survey was the information that out of
502,033 learners in the Free State in 2002:
• 15,774 (3.1%) were on their own without adult
supervision and support;
• 74,918 (14.9%) lived with relatives who were not their
parents;
• 106,201 (21.2%) lived with one parent;
• 105690 (21.1%) were hungry and in need of assistance.
A NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Each and every person has the same needs, if not the
same expectations of those needs being satisfied. Children
need care, food, shelter, protection, stability, and
consistent affection. In general, properly functioning
family life can provide that, but by no means always as any
social worker or family law practitioner can confirm.
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Do children have a right to those needs being satisfied?
A normal adult atavistic response is that of course children
do. It is only in the latter part of the last century that the
notion of children having rights that demand to be satisfied
rather than needs that should be provided for as a
fundamental moral or atavistic response has emerged. The
distinction is that children now have independently
standing enforceable rights rather than a moral claim on
those whose response is a desire to protect.
In established and stable societies the daily work of a
legal practitioner is based on the legal framework under
which they operate, and the practice and procedure that
has developed within that legal framework. The distinction
of whether a child has a right not to be abused, as opposed
to an expectation and hope that others will exercise a
moral and legal duty to provide protection, is barely
relevant to the exercise of legal procedures invoked to
attain the well being of that child. The legal practitioner is
unlikely to find the distinction particularly relevant for the
purposes of managing the case.
In a society in transition, and facing destabilising events,
the distinction becomes a matter of fundamental
importance to the survival of its children. If the law is
established on a child rights basis, then an argument can be
made that satisfaction of those rights takes precedence over
other legal interests or even rights (see, for example, Susan
A Wolfson, Children’s Rights: The Theoretical Underpinning of
the ‘Best Interests of the Child’, and Freeman and Veerman,
The Ideologies of Children’s Rights).
An important theoretical basis to be clear about is when
the rights of a child actually accrue to a child. There is the
theoretical approach of S I Benn in Human Rights – for whom
and for what?, where a right holder is defined as …
“someone aware of himself, not just as a process or
happening (as he may be aware of his digestive processes),
but as agent, as having the capacity to make decisions that
make a difference to the way the world goes … he is
conscious of himself as capable of having projects that
constitute certain existing or possible states ‘important’ or
‘unimportant’ ” (page 404).
This thinking is redolent of the “Gillick competent
child” (see below), and has some application to the child-
headed household situation. It does not go far enough
however, and the approach of John Kleinig is necessary to
complete the definition of who qualifies for rights. His view
is that a person who is “… capable of having projects” can
be a rights claimant because of the need to pursue those
projects according to their ability and functionality. A very
young or otherwise vulnerable child is not capable of
having a project interest, but has needs capable of being
labelled “welfare interests”.
Kleinig defines these as: “… those interests which are
indispensable to the pursuit and fulfillment of
characteristically human interests, whatever those interests
might be” (“Crime and the Concept of Harm”, American
Philosophical Quarterly (1978)). This is summarised by
Susan A Wolfson as follows:
“The best answer to the questions concerning who are right
holders and what the content of their rights are is that moral
(and legal) rights are held by those who have interests, which
are in some sense intimately and inextricably bound up with
their personalities. We can take ‘interests’ to mean roughly ‘a
capacity to be disposed to form conscious plans and projects.”
Does this definition exclude very young children?
Probably not – the sight of young hungry street children
doing what they can to survive shows a capacity “to be
disposed to form conscious plans and projects”. As for the
rights of infants, the Kleinig definition above is sufficient.
CONVENTION AND CONSTITUTION
RIGHTS
Legal practitioners are unlikely to worry unduly about a
definition of interests leading to principles of child
protection or child rights. The domestic law under which
they practice is the framework within which they work,
and they will know what the practical objective is for which
they strive, whatever the theoretical definition of that
objective may be.
Domestic law in established societies uses constitutional
and human rights, legislation, and common law as
reference points. In transitional societies, international
conventions and national constitutions are fundamentally
formative and influential in the development of theoretical
norms, which have a slow but long term impact on practice
and procedure.
Rights derived from conventions and constitutions
These rights can be traced through from the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) down to the
practical administration of justice in a district court. For
example, the Preamble to the UDHR states that
“… recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family
is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the
world …” This is echoed by the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), which
refers in its Preamble to the proclamation made by the UN
in the UDHR that … “childhood is entitled to special care
and assistance”. Recognition is given to the fact that “in all
countries in the world, there are children living in
exceptionally difficult conditions, and that such children
need special consideration”.
The UNCRC places an undertaking on states (in Art 2)
to take all appropriate measures to protect the child against
all forms of discrimination, including from family
members. Article 3 requires the best interests of the child
to be a primary consideration for courts of law,
administrative authorities and legislative bodies in all
actions involving children. Article 20 states that: “A child8
Amicus Curiae Issue 47 May/June 2003
temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family
environment, or in whose best interests cannot be allowed
to remain in that environment shall be entitled to special
protection and assistance provided by the State.”
These themes are continued in the African Charter on
the Rights and Welfare of the African Child (ACRWAC),
which notes that the situation of most African children …
“remains critical due to the unique factors of their socio-
economic, cultural, traditional and developmental
circumstances, natural disasters, armed conflicts,
exploitation and hunger …” Recognition is given to the
unique and privileged position occupied by the child in
African society, and the child’s need for legal protection
resulting from the needs of his physical, mental, moral and
social development.
The South African constitution gives every child a right
to family/parental care; basic nutrition, shelter, health care
services and social services; and the right not to be
required to perform work that is inappropriate to the
child, or places at risk the child’s well being, education,
physical or mental health and moral or social development.
The child’s interests are of paramount importance in every
matter concerning the child.
In summary, key matters referred to in the above sources
which are relevant to a consideration of the legal capacity
of children in the context of child-headed households are:
1. The importance of the family environment.
2. The importance of the best interests of the child as a
primary consideration.
3. The recognition that in all countries of the world there
are children living in difficult circumstances.
4. The recognition that “the situation of most African
children remains critical due to the unique factors …”.
The global, regional, and national convention and national
constitutional rights briefly referred to above set the legal
framework to the aspirations referred to as rights in those
instruments. By their nature the proclamations contained
in international conventions and national constitutions are
statements of general principle that validate and mandate
the satisfaction of the natural human needs of children.
Joachim Wolf in his essay “The Concept of the ‘Best
Interests’ in Terms of the UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child” (The Ideologies of Children’s Rights, Freeman
and Veerman), proposes that “the best interests of the
child” within the context of the UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child leads to one or other of three possible
conclusions which can perhaps be described as:
1. This is a legally binding concept
2. This is a political aspiration.
3. This is a partially coherent concept affected by different
national and cultural approaches.
There has been no counter argument to the concept of
“best interests” being other than rights based, and so the
conclusion of Joachim Wolf is a reasonable one to work
from when considering legal capacity of child-headed
household issues:
“With the coming into force of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, the ‘best interests of the child’ has become an
international legal concept. For the first time measures and
procedural requirements of states which prescribe how they have
to exercise their discretion in matters relating to the well-being
of children can be tested in terms of an international convention.”
In the face of the aids pandemic, it is clear that the law
of the legal capacity of children needs to change as a
response to social changes.
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL
CAPACITY OF CHILDREN
A starting point is that a child is a person under the age
of 18 years (UNCRC and ACRWAC).
The law in South Africa
In South Africa, even though a child is a person under
the age of 18 years, a person does not reach the age of
majority until 21. In contrast to common law countries,
there are two stages on the road to majority in South
Africa. Children are infans and then minor. A child has the
legal capacity of an infans from birth to the age of seven
years. A child then has the legal capacity of a minor from
the age of seven years until the age of majority at the age of
21 years. On the way to majority the child ceases to be a
child at the age of 18 years but does not attain the age of
majority until 21 years. This framework is likely to change
(see the South African Children’s Bill).
Factors other than age affect the legal capacity of a
person, including domicile, physical and mental disability
and illness, illegitimacy, and disqualification through civil
or criminal sanction. For the purposes of this paper only
the impact of age on legal capacity is considered.
South African family law has developed during a long
period of reasonable stability as far as the overall
framework of family law is concerned, (although there has
been fundamental political and social change in the
country). The unavoidable fact is that there is now a
catastrophic development that will impact on that slowly
developed law. That development is the stark reality that a
significant percentage of the overall population will be
families of children who live without any care or support
from adults either in the immediate family or the extended
family because such adults are dead.
The UK, the “competent child” and further cases
As already mentioned there is an innate reluctance on
the part of any legal establishment in any jurisdiction to
make abrupt changes in the way that the law is interpreted 9
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and applied. Two cases can be used to illustrate that. One
is an English case of the 1980’s and the other is a current
case, which started in the jurisdiction of England and Wales
and then progressed to the European Court of Human
Rights in Strasbourg. That case is now being taken into
account in the deliberations of a current Australian case.
These cases are just two examples of how the application
of law evolves in response to social developments, albeit
with many a pause for thought and glance over the
shoulder by the judiciary.
The first case is that of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech
Health Authority [1986] AC 112. This decision developed
the concept of the “competent child” which is now part of
the judicial arsenal in England and Wales. The case was also
a reminder that the welfare of a child overrides policy
considerations; or put another way, the interests of the
child are of such paramount importance that those
interests take precedence over other considerations such as
administrative regulations or even government policy. In a
report for the European Commission I completed in 2002
on child protection and the legal capacity of child care
worker issues, I labelled that the “overriding principle” for
the purposes of the report. That label is suitable for use in
the present instance.
Gillick concerned the problem of girls under the age of
16 years receiving contraceptive advice at an age when such
sexual activity was unlawful. Another issue arising from that
case was whether it was lawful for a medical practitioner to
give such advice to an under age girl without first getting
the consent of her parents. The House of Lords found that
a girl under the age of 16 had the legal capacity to consent
to medical examination and treatment, including
contraceptive treatment, if she had “sufficient maturity and
intelligence to understand the nature and implications of
the proposed treatment”. The court also held that…
“That the parental right to control a minor child deriving
from parental duty was a dwindling right which existed only
in so far as it was required for the child’s benefit and
protection that the extent and duration of that right could
not be ascertained by reference to a fixed age, but depended
on the degree of intelligence and understanding of that
particular child and a judgment of what was best for the
welfare of the child; that the parents’ right to determine
whether a child under 16 should have medical treatment
terminated when the child achieved sufficient intelligence and
understanding to make that decision itself…”
This development was similar to that in the United
States where schoolchildren were held to be “persons”
under the Constitution and their constitutional rights did
not just accrue at the age of majority.
In Reg v D [1984] AC 778 the House of Lords held that
a child’s capacity to make his/her own decision depends
upon that child having sufficient understanding and
intelligence to make the decision and is not to be
determined by reference to any judicially fixed age limit.
This principle could be applied in the context of child-
headed households whereby a child head of such a
household could be deemed to be not just able to make
his/her own decisions, but could be deemed to possess the
legal capacity to take on property rights and obligations.
A further case to be considered is the decision by the
European Court of Human Rights in Christine Goodwin v The
United Kingdom (Application no 28957/95). That case
considered alleged violations of Articles 8, 12, 13, and 14
of the European Convention on Human Rights in respect
of the legal status of transsexuals in the United Kingdom,
and particularly their treatment in the sphere of
employment, social security, pensions and marriage. In that
case the court “…emphasised the importance of keeping
the need for appropriate legal measures under review
having regard to scientific and societal development”, and
reiterated a principle that is identified time and time again
in human rights cases: the need to strike a fair balance
between the general interest of the community and the
interests of the individual.
THE FUTURE
What has all this got to do with orphaned children in
Africa? The answer is a great deal, because to ensure that
such children are housed, fed and clothed, established
property rights will have to be amended. To achieve that a
rights-based approach, (otherwise represented as the
“overriding principle”), and the Gillick competent child
principles can be used in support of such proposition.
To see why this is necessary, the needs of orphaned
children living in child-headed households must be
examined. Real life examples are everywhere in sub-
Saharan Africa, and are described in a report Starting From
Strengths – Community Care for Orphaned Children in Malawi
(final report submitted to the International Development
Research Centre (IDRC)). That report was undertaken in
response to Malawi’s rapidly rising population of children
who have lost one or both parents to the HIV/AIDS
pandemic sweeping sub-Saharan Africa.
Findings revealed the predominance of local cultural
definitions of, and responses to, HIV/AIDS. The extended
family and other traditional support structures continue to
support most of the children orphaned by AIDS, but the
research also underscored the strains on this system and
the increasing number of vulnerable children whose rights
are not recognised. Some of the children identified in the
research as being most at risk include:
1. Children who have experienced multiple loss of people,
especially over a short time;
2. Children who have lost their mother;
3. Girls;
4. Children who have experienced many different types of
loss (person, environment, property, status);
5. Children who do not have someone they can trust;10
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6. Children who are isolated (eg orphan-headed households)
7. The very quiet and reserved child;
8. Teenagers;
9. Very young infants with no parents; and
10.Children with a disability.
The research concludes by making a number of
recommendations promoting greater local, national,
regional, and international collaboration in supporting
children. These recommendations suggest specific
strategies falling under the categories of:
1. Building on traditional cultural strengths;
2. Addressing the alleviation of poverty;
3. Promoting a continuum of care;
4. Integrating services;
5. Counteracting “property grabbing”;
6. Supporting children’s psychological needs;
7. Arguing for a rights based approach.
The report Starting From Strengths – Community Care for
Orphaned Children in Malawi highlights the problem of
property grabbing in a real-life account entitled “An
orphan’s story”, which tells how a child-headed family
faced pressures from relatives seeking to lay claim to their
home and possessions after the death of their parents. Such
children need:
1. Their house to be legally theirs whatever outside claims
on that house maybe.
2. If the head of the household is under the age of adulthood,
he/she needs to have the legal capacity to interact with
the state as a legal adult on behalf of themselves and the
younger children for whom they care to obtain welfare
benefits in the form of money, health benefits,
education, and legal protection from predators.
3. Where possible the head of the household should be
able to interact with aid agencies, social welfare
departments, and suppliers of food, fuel and water.
The International Red Cross recommend that parents
who know that they are about to die should make wills to
ensure that the children benefit from use of the family
property. The making of a will does not solve the entire
problem however because the children may not benefit
from it. For example, the beneficiary of the will maybe an
uncle/aunt or some other adult who has lent money to the
parents provided that the family property is passed to that
other adult. It may not be possible to pass the family
property to the children because that property is charged
to a bank or other creditor.
How can the children avoid being made homeless in such
a situation? The overriding principle that the interests of the
children are of paramount importance, the “best interests”
right in the UN Convention on The Rights of the Child,
and the Gillick “competent child” arguments can be deployed.
The needs of children in Southern Africa are recognised,
and have attracted responses in The Children’s Bill and
cases such as Republic of South Africa & others v Grootboom
(“Grootboom”) 2001(1) SA 46 (CC), 2000(11) BCLR 1169
(CC).
South Africa: The Children’s Bill
A number of important measures directly relevant to
child-headed households are contained in the Bill, including:
• A provincial head of social development may recognise
a household as child-headed if the parent or primary-
care giver is terminally ill or dead, no adult family
member is available to care for the children, and a child
has assumed the role of primary care-giver in respect of
a child/children in the household;
• A child-headed household must function under the
supervision of an adult designated by a child and family
court or other approved body;
• The designated adult may collect state benefits to which
the household is entitled, and must consult with the
child at the head of the household (and others if they
are old enough) before taking decisions which affect them;
• The child-head of household may take day-to-day
decisions relating to the household and the children in
it, subject to the supervision and advice of the adult
person concerned;
• A child-headed household may not be excluded from
any form of state relief for poor households solely
because it is child-headed;
• Every child who owns property has the right to the
administration of that property in his/her best interests;
• State bodies and employees and anyone else in
authority with official control over a child must adhere
to the “best interest” principle – ie that the child’s best
interest is of paramount importance.
TheChildren’s Act will take precedence over other legislation,
thus reflecting the overriding principle of child rights.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
In practice in the 1980’s I was able to obtain the support
of individual judges in particular cases in varying the
property rights of parents by transferring those property
rights to the children on the basis of the “overriding
principle”. Under the law of England and Wales, those
children could not directly hold that property and the
property was therefore held by the Court of Protection and
administered by a nominated adult. Property which
belonged to the father of an illegitimate child was
transferred to the mother of that illegitimate child on the
same basis during the 1990s.
Subsequent courts considered that to be too radical, and
the practice is now that property transferred from the
father of an illegitimate child to the mother of that child,
or directly for the use of that illegitimate child, should only 11
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be used for the benefit of the child during his/her minority.
Once that child has attained majority, the property, or
capital used for the benefit of the child during their
minority, should be returned to the father.
Within these cases lies a clue to the preservation of
housing, at least for child-headed households. Judicial
practice or legislation could ensure that the orphaned
children of any householders would have pre-emptive
property rights over that property until the youngest child
of the family attains their majority. It is only then that any
legatee or mortgagee can obtain the property for their (or
their successors’) use.
Changes in judicial practice and/or legislation can be
justified on the need to adapt the law in the face of
society’s changing needs. The adaptation of the law would
be on the basis of the overriding principle that the interests
and welfare of children is of paramount importance which
would tip the balance that has to be struck between the
general interest of the community and the interests of the
individual in favour of the child/children. In the situation
under consideration there can be no conflict between the
child as individual and the community because the best
interests of child-headed households coincide with the best
interests of the community.
The conflict between the child-headed household and
legatees or mortgagees is resolved by a provision that once
the youngest child of the child-headed household attains
the age of majority the legatee or mortgagee can exercise
their deferred property rights and can enter into their
property. Where ownership of family property is unclear
the overriding principle would operate to defer any third
party claims on that property until the youngest child of a
child-headed household attains majority.
The Gillick concept of the competent child is relevant
here because if a child is looking after their younger
brothers and sister (even if that is very hard for them), that
child is showing a sufficient level of maturity for the law to
deem that child to be able to take on a legal capacity
normally allowed to adults to enable that child to
undertake their family responsibilities. The rights-based
approach determines that the housing needs of each child
of the child-headed household, (whether Gillick-competent
or not) must be satisfied as a priority over any other
conflicting interests and claims.
The preservation of any family housing will be one major
factor in ensuring the convention and constitutional rights
of children living in child-headed households.
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